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ABSTRACT
This paper traces the role of American technocrats in popularizing 
the notion later dubbed the ‘technological fix’. Channeled by their 
long-term ‘chief’, Howard Scott, their claim was that technology always 
provides the most effective solution to modern social, cultural and 
political problems. The account focuses on the expression of this 
technological faith, and how it was proselytized, from the era of 
high industrialism between the World Wars through, and beyond, 
the nuclear age. I argue that the packaging and promotion of these 
ideas relied on allegorical technological tales and readily-absorbed 
graphic imagery. Combined with what Scott called ‘symbolization’, 
this seductive discourse preached beliefs about technology to broad 
audiences. The style and conviction of the messages were echoed by 
establishment figures such as National Lab director Alvin Weinberg, 
who employed the techniques to convert mainstream and elite 
audiences through the end of the twentieth century.
Introduction
Confidence in societal progress via engineering solutions became a feature of industrial 
discourse from the early twentieth century.1 This paper addresses the popularization of such 
modernist faith over subsequent decades, focusing on the narrative techniques that underlay 
them. It argues that effective rhetoric about the problem-solving powers of technologies 
was developed and delivered by two key apostles, the technocrat Howard Scott and national 
post-WWII laboratory director Alvin Weinberg. Their evangelizing of the transformative 
social and political potential of technologies was unusually enduring, influencing broad 
audiences through the end of the century.
The paper focuses on a specific but fertile article of their shared faith: the notion that 
technological solutions are superior to more traditional political, economic, educational, 
and other social-science approaches to problem-solving. In the most radical form of the 
claim, its proponents argued that technological innovation could bypass or entirely replace 
these traditional approaches to human issues. By tracing the idea through its networks of 
dissemination, and employing close textual analysis of newly available sources, the paper 
addresses how modern technological beliefs were packaged and spread for wider publics.
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The account traces these discourses about technology, and the ways they were commu-
nicated, from the era of high industrialism between the World Wars through, and beyond, 
the nuclear age. Trust in the transformative social powers of technology was promoted most 
consistently in North America by a handful of self-identified ‘technocrats’, identified by John 
M. Jordan as the most radical of a wave of progressive technologists.2 Centered initially on 
groups associated with autodidact engineer Howard Scott (1890–1970), the nascent concept 
was later refined and championed through the speech-making of physicist-administrator 
Alvin Weinberg (1915–2006) from the 1960s who dubbed it ‘the technological fix’.
The time frame, historical correlations and methodology of this study are noteworthy 
extensions of prior researches. Scott and Weinberg are both well known to historians of 
the twentieth century in the distinctive contexts of interwar Technocracy and postwar 
nuclear power, respectively, but they and their organizations have previously been studied 
separately and over the periods of their greatest public prominence, and with attention to 
more diffuse themes.3 The present paper instead begins from such familiar but segregated 
accounts to trace the intersecting professional activities of these key promoters over some 
nine decades. Its focus is not the flowering and decline of a political movement, or of soci-
etal experimentation with novel energy supplies. Instead, the work specifically tracks the 
promotion of engineering solutions for societal problems, a notion that was condensed into 
popular faith in technological fixes.
The research is based on hitherto unavailable archival holdings that chronicle this broad 
timespan via a variety of unpublished correspondence, speeches, exhibition materials and 
limited-circulation texts. Importantly, the archives of regional Technocracy chapters extend 
some thirty years beyond the death of their founder to the end of the twentieth century, and 
document how narratives about the societal power of technology mutated during the post-
Scott era for members and their targeted audiences. Similarly, the unpublished papers of 
Alvin Weinberg provide significant insights into how his private views and public addresses 
about technology altered over the latter decades of his career. The collections reveal how, in 
both contexts, their creators dedicated unusual attention to condensing and communicating 
their claims. These textual and illustrative materials consequently provide privileged access 
to evolving notions of technological fixes and to the development of influential rhetorical 
practices.4
Indeed, careful attention to the nature of this discourse, and its orientation toward wider 
culture, is at the methodological center of this piece.5 Focusing on a close-reading of the 
speeches, articles and illustrations employed by both Scott and Weinberg, I argue that the 
techniques of popularization adopted by them were markedly different from traditional 
engineering communications. This rhetorical interpretation illustrates how their style of 
dissemination, as much as the rationale of their arguments, promoted cultural confidence 
in technological fixes.
The work argues that self-evident and simple examples were presented as easily-absorbed 
tales that reshaped the radical discourse of interwar technocracy into a style of communi-
cation amenable to post-Second World War policy-making and public understandings of 
science and technology. Key determinants in this transition were the characters of Howard 
Scott and Alvin Weinberg as energetic missionaries, and the form and content of their 
rhetoric, which supported a form of persuasion more akin to religious discourse.
The resonances between expressions of technological confidence, social progress and 
religious faith had been remarked as early as the 1920s, with Dora Russell, for example, 
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linking American industrial zeal (‘the dogmas of machine-worshippers’) with the social 
ideals of the Russian revolution.6 Both the ideological and theological connotations of this 
conviction, and more particularly the style of communication by which it was promoted, 
are threads interwoven through this paper. It focuses on how the deceptively discrete and 
simple claim was proselytized to influence wider cultural creeds.
Scott and Weinberg preached tales of wise technological problem-solving to broad audi-
ences. Their typical narrative structure resembled a parable, and iconic graphics replaced 
detailed illustrations. Recounting universalized tales of engineering authority and honed by 
years of repetition, the sparse narratives and concrete examples attracted successive waves 
of receptive audience.
The timescale, comparative approach, and attention to the style of dissemination to broad 
audiences argue that faith in the progressive nature of technologies was not limited to a 
naïve period of early engagement, but became a confidence embedded throughout modern 
culture by the late twentieth century.
Technocratic organizations and their seminal messages
Examples of what were later dubbed ‘technological fixes’ are an important feature of Howard 
Scott’s rhetoric from the earliest communications of the Technical Alliance, an organiza-
tion that he co-founded in 1919. Consisting initially of a group of some seventeen men 
and women, the loose affiliation included economic philosopher Thorstein Veblen (1857–
1929), electrical engineer Charles Steinmetz (1865–1923), conservationist Benton Mackaye 
(1879–1975), architect Frederick L. Ackerman (1878–1950) and physicist Richard C. Tolman 
(1881–1948). Most of them identified publicly with what American contemporaries rec-
ognized as ‘progressive’ and ‘reform’ policies in the period before and after the First World 
War, and a number of the organization’s advocates subsequently were to occupy posts in 
the Roosevelt administrations during the 1930s and 1940s.7
The purpose of the Alliance, stated their first pamphlet, was ‘to survey the possibility of 
applying the achievements of science to societal and industrial affairs’. By collecting sound 
facts and applying rational engineering principles to modern problems, the not-for-profit 
organization would champion the replacement of ‘maladministration and chaos imposed 
upon the industrial mechanism’.8 The theme of the group’s message was that technical 
experts, rather than politicians and financial interests, were the only viable providers of 
effective solutions for modern society.
Howard Scott was the public voice and Chief Engineer of the Technical Alliance and its 
successor organization, Technocracy Inc. Surrounded by myths, Scott’s limited engineering 
training and experience appear to have been important to his style of engaging with wide 
audiences. Described by historian William Akin as a ‘bohemian engineer’, he frequented 
Greenwich Village in New York through the 1920s. A persuasive and magnetic speaker, 
Scott’s self-confidence, informal speaking style and fluent command of data on industrial 
practices impressed his audiences, including established scientists and engineers.9
In the economic and industrial environment after the First World War, the ideas fostered 
by the Technical Alliance gained diverse attention. Labor organizations such as the Railroad 
Brotherhood and International Workers of the World consulted the group,10 and the New 
York World, aligned with the national Democratic Party, published a lengthy interview with 
Scott a year later.
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The newspaper article provides the first recorded recounting by Scott of an anecdote 
of unusual persuasive power: a succinct example showing how a technical solution could 
replace social, legal and economic approaches:
For lack of anything better to say, I asked him a question which every advocate of a new order 
will recognize as an old acquaintance: ‘Won’t you have to change human nature first?’
Mr. Scott smiled dryly.
‘Did you have to change human nature’, he asked ‘in order to keep passengers from standing 
on car platforms?’
‘Go on’, I said, ‘I’m listening’.
‘They put up signs first’, he continued, ‘prohibiting the dangerous practice, but the passengers 
still crowded the platform. Then they got ordinances passed, and the platform remained as 
crowded as before. Policemen, legislators, public service commissions all took a hand but to 
no effect; then the problem was put up to an engineer’.
‘The engineers solved it easily. They built cars that didn’t have platforms’.11
As his audience appreciated, the ‘cars’ were streetcars; the ‘platforms’ were the open board-
ing areas and steps at one or both ends. By enclosing these areas and removing exter-
nal hand-holds from which passengers could hang (and fall), engineering design could 
straightforwardly compel and correct human behaviors. Thus, where legislation and moral 
exhortations failed, engineers and their technologies could secure desired social outcomes. 
This first telling of the tale contained the seeds of a notion that was to spawn corollaries 
and compact coinings over subsequent decades. The central message of the anecdote was 
the superiority of technical innovation over social solutions (‘technological fixes’), which 
entrained confidence in the power of inventions to compel societal change (‘technologi-
cal determinism’), implied the superior problem-solving abilities of engineers over other 
varieties of expert (‘technocracy’) and their role in the consequent advance of civilization 
(‘technological progressivism’). Linked to the potent tale, the hubris of these abstract ideas 
was contagious.
This single example was to develop a rhetorical life of its own. It was restated, recast and 
reapplied to explain the logic of engineering approaches to new socio-political situations 
over the following decades, and both its content and form informed the template for later 
promotion of the technological fix. As discussed below, its practiced delivery in numerous 
circumstances made the message generic enough to reduce technocratic ideology to an 
unassailable truth. So compelling was the tale that it was reproduced in American techno-
cratic literature into the twenty-first century.12
The anecdote was timely. Horse-drawn streetcars had been largely replaced by motor 
vehicles by the end of the nineteenth century, and passenger safety gained rising attention. 
American streetcars had begun to incorporate features such as enclosed platforms and 
pedestrian fenders during the 1890s, and automatic doors and folding steps from the 1910s, 
although Scott’s crediting of beneficent engineers was questionable.13 When he was inter-
viewed in 1921, these improvements were becoming standard features of new streetcars, 
and older models in major cities were being retrofitted. Production of the mass-produced 
Birney Safety Car of 1915, in fact, peaked in 1921, and improved designs such as the popular 
Presidents’ Conference Committee (PCC) streetcar were being introduced as late as 1936.14
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The brief tale was supported by other American intellectual currents of the period. 
Economist Stuart Chase, arguably the most visible member of the Technical Alliance group 
during the mid-1920s, published on industrial inefficiency, waste and consumption.15 
Traditional production methods and social configurations in factories were rebuked as inef-
fective and slow. ‘Efficiency engineers’ became more prominent, with Commerce Secretary 
Herbert Hoover channeling the ideas of Frederick W. Taylor (1856–1915) regarding ‘sci-
entific management’.16 The tale of the safe streetcar fitted the wider narrative of bypassing 
old social problems via rational design.
A broader cultural current was the growing valorization of technology in American life. 
The ‘Machine Age’, a phrase that exploded in popularity during the interwar period, reflected 
a new pace and confidence for modern society. New inventions provoked expectations of 
societal transformation, as argued by Bernhard Rieger, David Edgerton and others.17 The 
phrase signaled public awareness of the dependence of urban life on modern technologies, 
and labeled conflicting sentiments about the positive but unavoidable changes delivered 
by technological change. Scott’s rational streetcar was the vehicle by which the inevitable 
future would be delivered.18
Channeled through the persuasive character of Howard Scott, this simple story was to 
survive organizational shifts. While the Technical Alliance faded from public view, the 
financial crisis of 1929 and the deepening economic depression brought Scott’s ideas to 
much larger audiences during 1932–1933, a period when effective actions were lacking 
from the two major political parties. Scott and a handful of former Technical Alliance 
members coalesced to revive work on an ‘Energy Survey of North America’, intended to 
analyze national growth in engineering, rather than in economic, terms. Under the banner 
of ‘Technocracy’, the group worked in vacant rooms at Columbia University’s Industrial 
Engineering department, where for some eight months they collected statistics on industrial 
production.19 By mid-1932, some of their charts and predictions had been leaked to research 
bodies, labor organizations, economists and newspapers. Scott again served as the Director 
and charismatic spokesperson for the small cluster of technical experts, and over the next 
year was inundated with national attention. As he sloganized it, ‘the word technocracy, as 
representative of a new body of thought, means governance by science, social control through 
the power of technique’.20
The group’s dedicated focus and confident explanations appeared to offer a quick route 
out of the economic crisis. Attracting a strong coterie of engineers alongside wider audi-
ences, it excluded only active politicians and repeatedly disavowed political affiliations from 
either the left or right.21 The organization accreted unaffiliated supporters and interpreters 
over the following months. Its rapid rise was bolstered by its enigmatic character: as Scott 
noted in his only national radio broadcast some eight months after the group’s formation, 
‘to date, it has written fewer than 14,000 words but, judging from its response on this conti-
nent and abroad, those 14,000 words have done their work well’.22 Indeed, the pared-down 
character of these populist appeals was to become central to the organization’s enduring 
rhetorical style.
Public attention exacerbated divisions within the group, however. Scott’s incautious 
statements and misleading background brought withering criticisms.23 In 1933 he and a 
subset of adherents – notably geophysicist Marion King Hubbert (1903–1989) – legally 
incorporated their organization to consolidate publicity. Technocracy Inc consequently 
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became the official voice of the movement, and more often than not the personal voice of 
its ‘Chief ’. Scott’s communications consequently became the principal information channel.
From the mid-1930s the newly formalized organization founded local chapters across 
the United States and Canada, which preached its compelling tales via membership drives, 
exhibits, local speeches and lectures, and via regionally-circulated newsletters and maga-
zines. Unlike its numerous competitors, Technocracy Inc proved long-lived. Dominated by 
the views of Howard Scott until his death in 1970 and beyond, its ‘continental headquarters’ 
(CHQ) shifted successively from New York to Pennsylvania to Georgia and, during the 
1990s, to a small town in the state of Washington nearer the center of mass of its remaining 
supporters in the western USA and Canada. With its hierarchical direction but reliance on 
grassroots activities, the organization provided a remarkably stable and sparsely authori-
tative message through the century. This simple administrative configuration and carefully 
controlled content contributed to the wide dissemination of some of its views and survival 
into the internet age.
The most enduring of these notions was faith in technological solutions for complex 
social, political and economic problems, and the compact expression of what others came 
to call ‘the technological fix’.
Life history of a modern parable
Scott’s 1921 anecdote about streetcar design may have been a regular feature of his private 
conversations before, and certainly of public addresses after, the emergence of Technocracy 
Inc. With the example of streetcars replaced by railway carriages, for example, it is recorded 
some sixteen years after the New York World interview in another of Scott’s speeches:
People say you can’t change human nature. We of the engineering profession approach it in 
another way. The only method of regulating has been to prohibit. You have noticed the sign, 
‘Passengers are prohibited from standing on platforms’, in railway cars. Engineers came along 
and designed a train without platforms and said, ‘Stand on them if you can’.
Issues of coercion and control melt away, he suggested, when replaced by benign physical 
environments that ensure safety. The same lecture gave a second example of engineering 
design that prudently guided appropriate social behaviors in factories. Instead of signs 
prohibiting dangerous use of equipment, he showed the picture of an accident-proof press. 
‘You cannot be hurt by any operation of the machines. Put your hand in, and it won’t work. 
Even cigarette smoke will stop it. The product can be made responsible’.24
In effect the machine, rather than the operator, embodies moral authority rather like a 
parent constraining the behavior of a willfully disobedient child. Yet Scott never analyzed 
his rhetorical anecdotes further, and seldom multiplied them. The canonical example of 
public transport appears again in a 1952 speech, but now linked to the fashionable topic in 
American psychology of behavioral conditioning:
[Y] ou see in the matter of conditioning, remember the old railway coaches that had the metal 
sign on them? They’re still running around. ‘Passengers are prohibited from standing on the 
platform of this coach. It’s contrary to law’. Well, that’s your legalistic, moral approach. It forbids 
people. That isn’t the scientific, technological approach. You design a car without a platform 
and say stand on it if you can. Very simple.25
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And again, during the late 1950s, the example reiterates the efficacy of engineering over 
morality and politics. The casual oratory now hints more overtly – and perhaps smugly – at 
the intellectual hierarchy of wise designers versus an obstinate public:
You see the technological approach to these problems is totally different than the moralistic, 
arid, legalistic approach … Well, the engineer just designs the car without a platform, and he 
says stand on it if you can. You’re a sucker if you try it – it isn’t there.26
Scott’s delivery in each of these cases differs from his more general argumentative ploy of 
displaying graphs and quoting industrial statistics that indicate seemingly inevitable trends 
– in particular, the impending failure of capitalist economics.27 The positivist reliance on 
quantifiable evidence is curiously replaced by an almost religious faith. The concise sketches 
are akin to New Testament parables: vaguely situated allegories that were seemingly univer-
sal in their applicability to new situations. The structure and esthetics of the narratives and 
anecdotes arguably accentuated the appeal of these ideas. Delivered verbally and graphically 
with the imprecision of everyday language, they suggested common-sense truths having an 
archetypal generality. Like the best parables, Scott’s tales provided revelatory insights that 
appeared, in retrospect, self-evident to his audiences.
The rhetorical form of the parable traditionally compares and contrasts, with ‘bad’ vs. 
‘good’, in this case, being exemplified by willful human misbehaviors vs. astute engineering, 
respectively. Like traditional parables, which communicate a moral or spiritual message, 
Scott’s tales express modern realities with an overarching judgment: engineering designs 
effectively compel social change and circumvent resistance, and consequently should be 
recognized as the most beneficent means of ensuring societal improvement. The stories 
contrast ineffective and wrong-minded societal actions – prohibiting, regulating and man-
dating – with the automatic social controls imposed by rational designs and their sage (and 
morally responsible) designers.
The parable-like role of the anecdotes and evangelistic tone of the public meetings is 
also suggested by Scott’s deportment as an impressively tall, deep-voiced and revered figure 
addressed by acolytes as ‘the Chief ’, and by one Chapter’s collection of such writings and 
speeches after his death into a publication of Biblical import, The Words and Wisdom of 
Howard Scott.28 Anthropologist Margaret Meade, a close friend of Scott throughout his life, 
described him as ‘an extraordinary person, well over six feet in height, gaunt and rangy, Irish 
and somehow a man of the frontier, endlessly inventive and prophetic’.29 Scott’s rhetorical 
tone matched his public persona. The secular sermons were typically extended by oppor-
tunities for collective enlightenment, with deferential audience queries receiving lengthy 
and discursive responses from the Chief. The sessions disseminated technocratic theory in 
an appealing demotic style usually supported by technological aids. Indeed, through the 
1960s, most of Scott’s interactions with members of the organization were in the form of 
long-distance telephone question-and-preaching sessions that followed some local chapter 
meetings.
The streetcar anecdote appears to have originated and remained with Scott himself. It is 
notably absent, for example, from the uncredited Technocracy Study Course written by the 
organization’s co-founder M. King Hubbert. There, a relatively pale alternative is recounted 
instead to communicate the potency of technological determinism:
It is seldom appreciated to what extent … technological factors determine the activities of 
human beings … [T] housands of people cross the Hudson River daily at 125th Street, and 
almost no-one crosses the river at 116th Street. There is no law… It merely happens that there 
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is a ferry at the former place which operates continuously, and none at the latter. It is possible 
to get across the river at 116th Street, but under the existing technological controls the great 
majority of the members of the human species find the passageway at 125th Street the more 
convenient. This gives us a clue to the most fundamental social control technique that exists.30
What Scott had exemplified as clear-headed public protection ensured by thoughtful design 
becomes an anodyne technique of social regulation. In fact, Scott’s paternalism and com-
monsensical tales contrast with a colder, Brave New World tone in Hubbert’s Course.31 
One of its lessons (‘20. The Nature of the Human Animal’) discusses at some length Ivan 
Pavlov’s experiments and contemporary findings in endocrinology, arguing for the rational 
conditioning and shaping of social behaviors by the methods of science. By implication, 
popular beliefs and actions are shaped predominantly by their social environments, and 
must give way to rational approaches of experts able to engineer those environments to 
achieve desired behaviors. The appeal to rationality and scientific tone were central elements 
of the message.32
Iconic imagery
Sometime during the 1930s, a graphic was prepared by Technocracy Inc to illustrate the orig-
inal version of Scott’s anecdote.33 According to the present-day administrator of the organ-
ization, the streetcar image ‘along with a dozen others depicting mankind’s evolution into 
the technological age was displayed along the upper walls on every Section Headquarters on 
the continent’. It featured thereafter as one of the paradigmatic illustrations used to explain 
technocracy in public outreach programs (Figure 1).34
Versions of the illustration also were reproduced in post-Second World War technocracy 
publications, and carried various captions. Scott’s example had been multiplied to serve 
Figure 1. technocracy and the technological solution to economic, political and social problems: rational 
streetcar design (n.d.). the origins of the four-color graphic, reprinted in post-card size, remain unclear; 
‘Metropolitan s.r.r. corp’ mentioned in the central panel of the illustration may refer to the stockbridge 
rail-road, Massachusetts, although technocracy inc had no chapters in the state.
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distinct rhetorical purposes, often stretched to fit new symbolic functions. The parable 
featured in a 1945 article on streetcar usage in Vancouver, Canada, for example, to illustrate 
the more general claim of the inevitable progress of technologies and their consequent 
positive societal benefits. What safe streetcars had contributed for modern orderly cities, it 
suggested, other technologies would assuredly multiply.35 In 1946, Technocracy member 
Leslie Bounds used the streetcar as a looser analogy to illustrate a general technique for 
eradicating crime. The caption was:
We can end chiseling and the greater proportion of crime in America, not by passing laws or 
the greater efforts to enforce existing laws, but by the simple expedient of making it impossible 
and unnecessary to commit the crimes.36
Technological innovation would supplant laws and bypass traditional behavioral techniques 
such as moral guidance, education, and prosecution. Alongside this bold prediction, the 
author proposed a much more widely accepted forecast. Urban regeneration would replace 
slum neighborhoods, a technological transformation that would alter living contexts and, 
he argued, inevitably change the human behaviors that resulted from them.
Member Walter Palm reused the streetcar graphic in The Technocrat magazine two years 
later to argue more broadly and allegorically that
[i] t is futile to attempt to solve the social problems of this continent by business and political 
methods. An entirely new design is needed. Since our problems are technological, only a 
technological solution is adequate. The chart … illustrates the simplicity and ease with which 
problems are solved by our scientists, technologists and engineers.37
And, in 1952, The Northwest Technocrat employed the same illustration to accompany an 
article on dangerous practices of transporting livestock to market:
This Chart depicts graphically Technocracy’s scientific approach to our social problem; a tech-
nological, physical solution for what is fundamentally a purely physical problem. Result, greater 
safety and comfort, and the elimination of ‘crime’.38
Cattle, people and society at large, it showed, could be safeguarded by shrewd technolog-
ical guidance. Nevertheless, in an era when tramways were being buried under asphalt to 
dedicate urban streets to buses and cars, the streetcar example no longer illustrated the 
leading edge of engineering wisdom and beneficence, but rather the past. Even so, while 
the potency of the example faded, Technocracy Inc did not update its message. The course 
materials, public exhibits and lectures remained based on imagery conceived between the 
Wars (Figure 2).39
Reproduced in regional speeches and periodicals, the rhetoric of Technocracy Inc may 
appear relatively limited in scope. As shown by the anecdote and its iconic depiction, the 
communications were generally repetitive rather than extensible. The simple narrative struc-
ture was the key to propagating its message. Contemporary analyses over some fifty years 
mapped new situations onto the writings and narrative archetypes of the interwar period. 
For members, this endurance may have reflected confidence in, or even nostalgia for, the 
stability and traditions of Technocracy Inc embodied by Howard Scott. But, as discussed 
below, the messages were periodically disseminated more widely, and their perennial usage 
suggests that they had sustained effectiveness not only within the organization but also for 
attracting wider publics.
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From streetcars to nuclear weapons: the rhetoric of social solutions via 
science and technology
Scott’s claims identifying technology and technologists as the solution to modern problems, 
developed and sketched between the late-1910s and early 1930s, can be summarized as 
follows:
(1)  Social problems of modern society are caused, and ultimately solved, by techno-
logical change.
(2)  Rational technological change of environments can produce new social behaviors 
rapidly.
(3)  Conventional solutions – notably economics, politics and social initiatives such as 
education – are ineffective.
(4)  Only technically competent people, by redesigning physical environments, are 
equipped to solve modern social problems.
One subsequent ally for at least the first two of these claims was scientist and urban plan-
ner Richard L. Meier, whose writings were castigated by a 1956 book reviewer as ‘reflect-
ing naïve rationalism or the spirit of technocratic speculation’.40 Describing himself as a 
Figure 2. later reproduction of the example of the streetcar as technological fix for social ills. as a four-
color placard, the illustration was displayed in technocracy inc chapter houses across north america, but 
other versions appeared in technocracy inc literature between 1946 and 2001. all these later versions have 
inadvertently exchanged the top two text boxes of the original illustration, suggesting that the message 
was visually absorbed rather than analyzed. (reproduced in various grayscale versions in Bounds, “What’s 
yours is Mine,” 7; Palm, “Why north america Faces social change,” 9; ‘l.l.B.’, “subsidies and sabotage,” 
22; technocracy inc., Technocracy: Technological Continental Design. 1990 and 2001, respectively. color 
placard photographed at aldergrove, British columbia premises of technocracy inc, courtesy of current 
director george Wright.)
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technological optimist, Meier’s scholarly approach to technological solutions for societal 
ills was, however, the antithesis of the promotional techniques of American Technocrats. 
Meier’s writings focused on careful analysis of socio-technological systems and resisted 
reduction to a catch-phrase, parable or icon.41
Scott’s four claims are more readily recognizable in the subsequent discourse of Alvin 
Weinberg, long-time Director of Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), essayist and 
public speaker. Weinberg, who had described himself early in his career as ‘a Progressive’ 
who was concerned with the social responsibility and benefits of modern science, coined 
the term ‘technological fix’ in 1965.42 In Weinberg’s words, ‘A technological fix is a means 
for resolving a societal problem by adroit use of technology and with little or no alteration 
of social behavior’ and ‘technical inventions that could help resolve predominantly social 
problems’.43 His confident views mirrored the hubris of the technocrats and their faith in 
a society managed by technological innovations, and in which ‘social problems could be 
converted into technological problems’.44
The similarity of the views of Scott and Weinberg is suggested by a comparison of their 
respective rhetoric in public addresses:
(1)  Social problems of modern society are caused, and ultimately solved, by technological 
change
As Director of a National Laboratory dedicated to the development and application of 
nuclear energy, Weinberg was unusually frank in his acknowledgement of side-effects from 
modern technologies. An admirer of Rachel Carson’s work on the unintended ecological 
consequences of DDT, he also was vocal about the unsolved problems of nuclear waste 
and endemic safety issues with reactor designs and management. Yet Weinberg was also 
an ardent optimist about the powers of technological innovation to solve any societal prob-
lem, and to do so more effectively and speedily than conventional social and educational 
approaches, or via political or religious ideologies.45
(2)  Conventional solutions – notably economics, politics and social programs – are 
ineffective
During the financial crisis of the early 1930s, Scott was careful to distinguish the views of 
Technocracy Inc. from radical politics. This was reiterated periodically in the organization’s 
rhetoric – notably during the Second World War, when the Canadian government banned 
the organization because of its perceived anti-war stance, and after the Second World War, 
when the Red Scare discouraged political and social nonconformity in North America. 
Instead, Scott argued that both the ‘Price System’ (capitalist economics) and communism 
were outmoded, and that ‘Marxian political philosophy and Marxian economics were never 
sufficiently radical or revolutionary to handle the problems brought on by the impact of 
technology in a large size national society of today.46 In their place, he proposed technocratic 
problem-solving to circumvent politics entirely:
Technocracy has proposed the design of almost every component of a large scale social sys-
tem … a technological socialization is far more reaching, more drastic and more pervasive than 
anything that Marx or any socialist ever thought of.47
Alvin Weinberg, in his published 1966 speeches mooting the value of technological fixes 
to replace ‘social engineering’, made similar claims.48 The ‘Marxian view’, he noted, ‘seems 
archaic in this age of mass production and automation’:
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Technology has expanded our productive capacity so greatly that even though our distribution 
is still inefficient, and unfair by Marxian precepts, there is more than enough to go around. 
Technology has provided a ‘fix’ – greatly expanded production of goods – which enables our 
capitalistic society to achieve many of the aims of the Marxist social engineer.
Like Scott, he argued that technological solutions could deliver a progressive society ‘without 
going through the social revolution Marx viewed as inevitable’.49
(3)  Rational technological change of environments can produce new social behaviors 
rapidly
A recurring theme in Howard Scott’s public addresses had been the rationale of public 
safety. A rare departure from his streetcar example was his more general claim concerning 
how safety can be designed into technologies. In an interwar speech, he derided the upsurge 
of ‘propaganda against auto accidents’ and ‘great safety campaigns’,
yet accidents increase. Why? Not because drivers do not know how to drive. With split high-
ways, one-way traffic, raised or sunk crossings, poles and trees moved back fifteen feet from 
the road, with 4 degrees horizontal and 4 degrees vertical curves only, and with the highways 
lighted by sodium lamps, accidents would be reduced by more than 90 percent.50
The precise figures provided a reassuring counterpoint to emotive calls for public education. 
Behavioral change through public advertising was ineffective, he suggested, not merely 
because of recalcitrant citizens but because the modern world placed unfamiliar demands 
on non-experts.
A remarkably similar example was recounted by Weinberg some thirty years later: ‘a safer 
car … is a quicker and probably surer way to reduce traffic deaths than is a campaign to teach 
people to drive more carefully’.51 Indeed, the direct inspiration for Weinberg’s example was 
safety campaigner Ralph Nader, whose sister was a sociologist at ORNL. Nader was an early 
supporter of Weinberg’s views, but echoed just as precisely the speeches of Howard Scott: 
‘The illustrations of the remedial “fix” have been with us for years everywhere – from the 
automatic coupler on the railroads to a stairway railing’.52
Weinberg reinvigorated the potency of Scott’s and Nader’s railroad, factory and car 
safety examples by providing more dramatic illustrations of what he described as ‘Quick 
Technological Fixes for profound and almost infinitely complicated social problems, ‘fixes’ 
that are within the grasp of modern technology, and which would … eliminate the original 
social problem without requiring a change in the individual’s social attitudes’.53
Among his more provocative examples were the atomic bomb as a means of bypassing 
international negotiation, the intra-uterine device as a method of birth control that could 
side-step cultural norms about family size, a border wall between North and South Vietnam 
to end conflict, and the installation of air-conditioners in slums to literally cool down sum-
mer tensions and prevent urban unrest.54
(4)  Only technically competent people, by redesigning physical environments, are equipped 
to solve modern social problems
Both Scott and Weinberg broached this claim indirectly. It had been overt in the writings 
of Thorstein Veblen, who argued in 1921 for a ‘soviet of technicians’ as a body of experts 
to govern society.55 Scott, however, consistently shunned such a prediction, and instead 
argued for special qualities of engineers that transcended politics, social policy and ethical 
orientation:
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Engineers do not disagree on facts. They all know which direction a stone will drop. They 
all know that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points. If there is anything 
else they want to know as engineers, they find it out; and when they find it out, there isn’t the 
slightest disagreement … As engineers, they are no more radical than a yardstick and no more 
conservative than so many degrees Fahrenheit.56
Instead of a revolution that would replace politicians with technologists, Scott claimed that 
engineering methods would inevitably be recognized as the only means of exerting order in 
the modern world. As the ‘application of the knowledge of science and the methods of tech-
nology to social management’, Technocracy would provide ‘a blueprint for the operation of 
the North American Continent, in the same way that an engineer draws up the blueprint for 
an engineering project, or for a new design of engine, or for a continental telephone system’:
In doing this, Technocrats are not… influenced by any ethical ideal, but they are primarily 
concerned with function. The question in their minds is this: What design of social mechanism 
will operate at the maximum of efficiency with a minimum of oscillation?57
A generation later, Alvin Weinberg was even more cautious. His established role as Director 
of a National Lab may have provided insights and constraints unfamiliar to Howard Scott. 
Weinberg seldom broached a direct criticism of politicians, but repeatedly turned his sights 
on social scientists:
The technologist is appalled by the difficulties faced by the social engineer; to engineer even a 
small social change by inducing individuals to behave differently is always hard even when the 
change is rather neutral or even beneficial … By contrast, technological engineering is simple: 
the rocket, the reactor, and the desalination plants are devices that are expensive to develop, 
to be sure, but their feasibility is relatively easy to assess, and their success relatively easy to 
achieve once one understands the scientific principles that underlie them.
Unlike the Technocrats, who eschewed politicians, Weinberg argued for a revision of the 
working environment he knew best. He pleaded for the American government to ‘deploy 
its laboratories, its hardware contractors, and its engineering universities around social 
problems’.58 Thus the physical scientists and technologists who had so effectively conducted 
the Manhattan Project and postwar development would be reassigned to tackle societal 
issues via technological methods. Clever engineers would consequently serve as tools of 
government, rather than as replacements for it. Technical specialists would supplement, if 
not entirely supersede, legislators and educators.
Such comparisons show that Scott and Weinberg shared similar rhetorical ploys, and a 
significant subset of intellectual convictions. The content, form and tone of their messages 
were distinctive. While both typically sprinkled their engineering discourses with technical 
detail, their presentations to broader audiences gave descriptions of technological fixes, 
instead, in the form of generic parables trimmed of context. The compact nature of the 
brief anecdotes and easily-absorbed imagery promoted their effectiveness and retention, 
and presented an appeal to common sense. The effectiveness of technological solutions to 
social problems, they claimed, was a self-evident truism.59
The style of spreading this message was equally important. Meier limited his promotion 
of technological solutions to professional audiences, and usually in dry articles and books. 
Both Scott and Weinberg, by contrast, actively promoted their messages via speeches to 
broader publics. Scott, an Establishment outsider, preached his familiar examples mainly 
to the converted, but Weinberg, as Director of a postwar National Laboratory and policy 
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advisor to the American government, was prolific in public speaking to audiences rang-
ing from college commencement exercises to community groups, and publishing multiple 
instances of his essays in a wide range of scholarly journals for greater impact.60
From technocratic parables to tales of technological fixes
This close examination of rhetorical style illustrates close affinities between the oratory 
of Howard Scott and the subsequent advocacy by Alvin Weinberg. Tracing a ‘sound bite’ 
from post-WWI conversations to post-WWII speeches, meeting hall placards and tech-
nocratic publications, suggests continuities with the later-twentieth century promotion of 
the technological fix.
There is circumstantial evidence to suggest that technology analysts of the 1960s such 
as Richard Meier, Alvin Weinberg, Ralph Nader and some of their peers encountered tech-
nocratic rhetoric through novel promotional methods during and after the Second World 
War. The message of Technocracy Inc was widely circulated via numerous local Chapters, 
periodicals and public meetings. Scott’s streetcar anecdote and illustration were popular 
amid what was admittedly a small coterie of adherents, but their circulation was relatively 
high among American engineers and technologists compared to the general population, sug-
gesting a plausible route to wartime technologists and postwar designers such as Meier and 
Weinberg. From 1933, a technocracy group had been active in Weinberg’s native Chicago, 
the city that was to be the center of the Manhattan Project group in which he worked dur-
ing the War.61 Technocracy had similar appeal and publicity in southern California, where 
Richard L. Meier worked as a chemist during the War.
The visibility of the Technocrats in fact grew after the war, a period when young American 
professionals such as Meier and Weinberg were rapidly adapting to the novel environment 
of Big Science (a term coined by Weinberg), with its new context of national labs and gov-
ernment-sponsored research projects. The fresh setting encouraged larger-scale thinking 
and the application of scientific knowledge to new contexts. Both Meier and Weinberg had 
been early members of the Federation of Atomic Scientists in 1945, a group of Manhattan 
Project scientists and technologists who championed the need to apply science more effec-
tively to societal improvement. And Weinberg’s subsequent career at Oak Ridge, Tennessee 
had close ties to the Midwest and industrialized northeast which, along with the western 
USA and Canada, remained the heartland of Technocracy Inc.62
To attract such audiences, Technocracy Inc employed a communicative technique that 
Howard Scott dubbed ‘symbolization’, first mooted in 1937, trialed in mass demonstrations 
two years later, and systematized in the decade after the war. Centered on iconography, 
motorcade processions, and visual and audio spectacles, the practice had apparently arisen 
among the members emulating Scott’s own public presentation, but was rapidly theorized 
by key participants. Symbolization sought to arouse curiosity and attract fresh audiences 
by subliminal appeals:
The balance of the public is not interested and is incapable of assimilating the necessary facts 
and implications … At the proper moment, the trained organization of Technocracy may find 
it necessary to present Technocracy to the masses in assimilatible [sic] form …63
Employing searchlights, road signs, billboards, radio broadcasts, and exhibition trucks, the 
processions represented the regimentation and efficiency of the organization through the 
members’ adoption of regulation gray suits and vehicles. The events evoked comparisons 
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with European fascism, but the Technocrats stressed the role of modern technologies 
and media to communicate their matter-of-fact and emotion-free scientific rationale. 
Symbolization, according to Scott, was more effective than the commercial advertising of 
the day, designed as a holistic form of iconography intended to condense the organization’s 
themes and ideology into rapidly-absorbed visual representations. Uniform dress, machine-
like social organization and the monad (a yin-yang symbol in vermilion and chromium) 
became visual metaphors for the logic and modernity of technological solutions to societal 
problems. Like the streetcar graphic, the varied methods of symbolization were designed 
to win over audiences by sidestepping analysis.64
In the summer of 1947, Technocracy Inc implemented Operation Columbia, an all-out 
‘symbolization activity’ that was to be repeated across North America over the following 
decade. A fleet of several hundred regulation-gray vehicles made a two-week round-trip 
lecture tour and membership drive through cities along the west coast between Los Angeles 
and Vancouver, Canada.65 It was supported by mass mailing campaigns in the cities to be 
visited, an associated ‘Tech Net’ of shortwave radio amateurs to maintain communications 
through the parading convoy, some one-hundred ‘sound cars’ carrying public address sys-
tems and truck-mounted war-surplus searchlights to attract local audiences. Gray-suited 
volunteers distributed technocracy literature at the roadside to passing cars and visitors 
on foot, and in rented arenas in major cities; Vancouver alone drew some 5000 paying 
attendees.66 At each venue an exhibit bus displayed iconic posters, including the ubiquitous 
streetcar graphic. The following summer, Operation Golden Gate attracted some 400 cars 
and 2500 technocrats from around the USA to parade around the Bay Area, followed by a 
road tour to Los Angeles. Subsequent publicity spectacles on a less ambitious scale included 
Chapter-organized motorcades and picnics through the early 1950s.67 Either first- or sec-
ond-hand, the local activities and national press attention surrounding symbolization events 
likely provided the first exposure of many young postwar North American technologists 
like Weinberg and Meier to technocratic ideas.
There are hints of direct influence between technocrats and technological-fixers, for 
example in brief records of conversations and correspondence between Technocracy 
Inc co-founder M. King Hubbert and Alvin Weinberg between 1961 and at least 1967.68 
Nevertheless, demonstrating a causal link between these seminal promoters is not the pri-
mary aim of the present work. Instead, it prioritizes the atypical but shared nature of this 
technological discourse and its direction towards wide audiences. The rhetorical appeals 
and imagery employed by Scott and Weinberg – but disdained by Meier – were unconven-
tional in engineering communications, and arguably proved effective in encapsulating and 
spreading their confidences about the social powers of technology.
Revisiting the rhetoric of technocratic fixes after Scott
The association between technocracy and technological fixes developed gradually over 
the remainder of the century. Word-usage statistics indicate that the terms ‘technocracy’ 
and ‘technological fix’ rose significantly in circulation from the mid-1960s, suggesting the 
impact of Alvin Weinberg’s public discourse.69
Over the same time period, the words were used increasingly by critics as pejorative 
labels. The term ‘technocrat’ came to signify the member of a technological elite in a posi-
tion of political power, and ‘technological fixes’ became associated with seeking to replace 
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human concerns and democratic decision-making with coldly rational but simplistic engi-
neering manipulations. It is ironic that technocracy, which had touted the improvement 
of social environments by benevolent engineering interventions that bypassed politics, 
was increasingly criticized as a dangerous expression of modern governance. The popular 
understanding of technocracy – as reductive rational forces within conventional government 
– accorded more closely with Alvin Weinberg’s views, which never acknowledged the term.70
The later activities of Technocracy Inc contributed inadvertently to this alienation from 
its audiences. Following Howard Scott’s death in 1970, the organization retained and only 
cautiously expanded upon Scott’s views, somewhat akin to a nascent religious tradition. 
Reminiscent of the apostolic period of Christianity, the canon of speeches, articles and 
pamphlets was collected and reused, to be quoted in relation to contemporary technological 
and societal issues. The Technocracy Study Course was repackaged in abbreviated form, to 
act almost as a catechism for the organization’s beliefs. The technological examples were 
recounted but not extended. Instead, the texts were subtly recast in ways that suggest the 
influence of Alvin Weinberg’s independent advocacy. The organization accompanied the 
term technocracy with straplines that highlighted and streamlined its link to societal change. 
Technocracy was now defined pointedly as ‘the scientific method applied to sociological 
problems’ and promoted as ‘the Technological Social Design, permitting science to formu-
late a scientific socio-economic structure’.71
And while a seminal successor to Howard Scott failed to materialize, the organization 
fielded a handful of lesser evangelists for technocracy and prophecies of imminent soci-
etal catastrophe. With regional chapters and membership income falling, Technocracy Inc 
increasingly directed its energies towards a kind of missionary work: converting influential 
public figures thought to have a public identity relating to socially-responsible science, 
futurism or an anti-establishment orientation. Targets included science writer Isaac Asimov 
(then representing Zero Population Growth), ecologist-ethicist Garrett Hardin (author of 
controversial essays on managing environmental resources), Omni magazine editor Ben 
Bova, and dozens of others.72
Replies to the letter-writing campaigns were rare and unpromising. Aimed at critical public 
figures rather than broad audiences, the initiative had eschewed the compelling parables and 
icons for less concrete arguments that had little persuasive power. Garrett Hardin responded, 
‘the problems of human relations and the allocation of scarcities cannot be altered or escaped 
by worship of technology’ and the editor of the Bay Area Skeptic retorted, ‘do not assume that 
I am interested in exchanging letters on your Utopian Technocracy’. Few others replied at all.73
A senior technocrat mourned the social decline of their technological faith:
I do feel that Technocracy Inc. has lost its credibility and its appeal especially to people of 
technical and scientific sophistication, and indeed, to the public at large … In general it sounds 
more like a political opposition party, constantly nagging away at the status quo. How tiresome. 
And how futile. Where is the scientific thrust that focused on the unidirectional and irreversible 
progression of science and technology that gave rise to the concepts of Scott’s Technocracy 
in the first place?74
For his part, Alvin Weinberg in later life acknowledged with regret that certain technological 
solutions could not be implemented in a liberal democracy. Yet his autobiography champi-
oned the original tales of bombs, air conditioners and border walls as rational technological 
fixes applied to societal problem-solving, just as Howard Scott had confidently recounted 
the original streetcar parable three-quarters of a century earlier until his final years.75
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Conclusion
This paper has tracked the rhetoric of what came to be known as ‘technological fixes’ – tech-
nological approaches for solving societal problems – from the end of the First World War to 
the late twentieth century. While such amorphous confidences emerged from the activities of 
numerous technical workers operating in early twentieth century environments of modernity, 
their reduction to a compact article of faith that could be readily expressed, promoted and 
absorbed can be attributed to two eloquent prophets: Howard Scott and Alvin Weinberg.
Expressed as a modern parable, Scott’s streetcar anecdote proved remarkably appealing to 
audiences over decades. When he first related it, the example cited a contemporary transfor-
mation familiar to citizens in American cities and towns in an age of high industrialism. The 
appealingly rational tale of cool engineering wisdom triumphing over undisciplined citizens 
was compelling for his audiences. And the message embodied in the simple iconography 
could be readily absorbed – so much so that details of the increasingly nostalgic streetcar 
designs were scarcely noticed by audiences over the following decades. The success of the 
lesson in wider culture owed much to its brevity and superficial generality, making it imper-
vious to contemporary analysis and historical revisionism. Alvin Weinberg’s appropriation 
and extension of this metaphor – recounting logical anecdotes of engineering wisdom as 
new parables of the modern age – brought the notion of technological fixes to receptive 
audiences at graduation ceremonies, government policy-consultations and peer conferences.
Of equal note is how effectively the notion of technological fixes was disseminated. The 
simple messages were refined to their essentials by years of repetition. Aiding their spread 
and survival was the lack of documentary precision or elaboration, allowing them to be 
translated into allegories fitting new contexts and arguments. Communicated matter-of-
factly by Howard Scott and Alvin Weinberg as a handful of parables, the simple anecdotes 
were immune to criticism and easily recounted or displayed by supporters. And the rhe-
torical style appears to have yielded similar effects for both proponents: both Scott and 
Weinberg rehearsed their examples without extension or correction through their final years.
The potency and fertility of the rhetorical claims are noteworthy. The idea that techno-
logical design could be the most effective and rapid means of solving societal problems 
seemed, to the Technocrats and many engineers through the century, to be self-evident. 
This confidence entrained even more influential hidden assumptions, e.g. that the inevitable 
benefits of technological solutions are generally beyond dispute, and that technologies neces-
sarily determine social outcomes. Faith in progress and belief in technological determinism 
were implicit but readily-accepted implications of the anecdotes. Thus the style as much 
as the meager content of the messages delivered wide-ranging beliefs to non-engineering 
audiences as well as to technological experts.
This case study illustrates the careful attention given by the historical actors to their style 
of dissemination in order to persuade broad audiences, and argues for a similar attention 
on the part of historians. The identification of parables, icons, proselytizing and symboliza-
tion is helpful for understanding how brevity, imprecision and imagery proved not merely 
compelling, but inspirational, for audiences over decades. From the viewpoint of historical 
methodology, this account suggests the value of close reading of such popular discourses to 
better understand their role in the growth of modern cultural beliefs. For policy-makers, 
social analysts and historians of culture and technology, the promotion of technological 
fixes is salutary in illustrating how the power of simply-expressed ideas communicated by 
confident technical experts can shape the beliefs and actions of generations.
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across physics, engineering, science policy, behavioral psychology and social science over the 
next two years, and anthologized in numerous books thereafter. On its genesis, see Johnston, 
“Alvin Weinberg.”
61.  Elsner, Messianic Scientism, 65.
62.  Scott, “Origins of Technical Alliance & Technocracy.”
63.  Dickinson, Technocracy Digest.
64.  “Symbolization of Technocracy”, CHQ circular, November 1940, UAA 69-123-1 folder 5; 
Smith, “Symbolization Drives.”
65.  A film of the event made for internal consumption documents its meticulous organization, 
and describes a ‘long line of grey cars … extending nearly ten miles back from the Canadian 
border’. Technocracy Inc, “Operation Columbia.”
66.  Adair, The Technocrats, 101.
67.  e.g. Technocracy Inc, “Operation Bakersfield”; “Operation Ohio Valley.”
68.  Hubbert to W. T. Thagard and Weinberg, letter, 19 Sep 1961, CMOR Cab 6 Drawer 1, Hubbert 
file; Hubbert to Weinberg, letter, 31 Mar 1967, CMOR Cab 5 Drawer 4, Chron 1967-1, 
mentioning face-to-face encounters and topics of energy production and national resources.
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69.  Google Ngrams analysis of key terms. Michel et al., “Quantitative Analysis of Culture.”
70.  The principal publicist of Technocracy Inc in the post-Scott period actively sought to correct 
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dominated governing elites such as the Kremlin. See, for example, John A. Taube to S. Bialer 
and J. Afferica, letter, 4 Aug 1986, UAA 96-123-5 folder 149.
71.  The course materials long served as the standard instruction for members of the organization, 
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first time as a graphic in the shorter post-1970 versions.
72.  John A. Taube to I. Asimov, letter, 6 Feb 1980, UAA 96-123-5 folder 143; to B. Bova, letter, 
18 Aug 1982, UAA 96-123-5 folder 146. Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons”; “Lifeboat 
Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor.”
73.  Hardin to Taube, letter, 18 Oct 1981, UAA 96-123-5 folder 144; Robert Shaeffer to J. A. 
Taube, letter, 11 Oct 1983, UA 96-123-5 folder 146. Media coverage increasingly portrayed 
technocracy as an outmoded faith preserved by old men [Livingston, “Technocracy Still 
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